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Abstract 
 
During our investigation we have looked at the type of cooperation between two parties within a supply chain 
within the service rendering sector, viz. a large party, the damage insurance company, ‘ASR Schadeverzeke-
ringen NV’ at Utrecht (the Netherlands), versus several small counterparts, the repair companies in the Neth-
erlands who are working together under the umbrella - and the conditions and quality demands (!) - of the 
‘Stichting Schadegarant’ at Maarsbergen (the Netherlands). In spite of this last organisational circumstance  
there surely could be spoken in this case of cooperation between parties of unequal size (and power!).  
 
This investigation has been inspired by the study by Geyskens et al. on the cooperation between producers 
and sellers of cars in the United States of America and the Netherlands, an example of a part of a supply 
chain with a production function. Within this study a clear distinction has been made between two kinds of 
commitment, affective commitment and calculative commitment. Is was made clear that general measures 
should have different - and perhaps unexpected - effects on both types of commitment.   
 
During our investigation in a part of the supply chain with a service rendering function we have used the same 
inquiry questions as used by Geyskens et al. to see if the conclusions of the former investigation also apply in 
the latter one. In both inquiries the central point is the question how cooperation between one powerful party 
with a far more weaker counterpart can be improved without any negative consequences of the differences in 
size or power of the partners.  
 
Besides this we have also planned to use a number of investigation questions from a Wu and Cavusgil survey 
Our principal reason for this choice is the huge interest of learning within the process of collaboration between 
partners.  
 
We developed some factors of which we have assumed that they are having a certain influence on commit-
ment and collaboration. For this reason we took the factors total interdependence, interdependence asymme-
try, trust, learning intention, partner sensing and relationship initiation and developed these into construct 
variables on base of the inquiry statements which were presented to the participants of the inquiry. These 
construct variables were at first compared to affective commitment, to calculative commitment and to collabo-
ration.  
 
Eventually these constructs affective commitment, to calculative commitment and to collaboration were com-
pared to the final goal, alliance performance. A good reason for our interest is, that effective cooperation be-
tween partners within the numerous supply chains is of great influence for the successes of the supply chains 
as a whole. These comparisons were embodied in the form of twenty-one hypotheses. 
 
The main result from the inquiry among more than three hundred repair companies (out of about six hundred 
belonging to ‘Schadegarant’) is the greater interest of affective commitment to calculative commitment. Herein 
the factor trust is playing a mail roll: without any trust between the cooperating parties every attempt to come 
to better cooperation is bound to fail.  
 
Remarkable is the little interest for cooperation. It seems, that the participants are striving to keep their inde-
pendence wherever possible.  
 
The factor calculative commitment has been playing a negative roll in collaboration. This is a good reason for 
further investigation on this subject during future investigation. This is still more important because of the little 
interest between the two types of commitment in the numerous investigations so far. A clear result of our in-
quiry has been the different reactions between the developed factors and construct variables on these both 
types of commitment. As a result general measures to enhance the commitment in a cooperating situation 
between two - or more (!) - parties or partners are to have different - and unwanted (!) effects in case the exis-
tence of one of the two types of commitment.  
 
Because commitment is - next to trust - the first demand for a growing and flourishing relationship between 
parties, it is very important to pay attention to this phenomena.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
The economic activities of firms and the flow of products or services from produces tot consumer in almost all 
cases have been arranged within so-called supply chains. With the concept of ‘supply chain’ we mean in this 
article the whole of all firms to produce or transport or deliver goods or services to the final consumers. With-
out good functioning supply chains it would be impossible, that products and services effectively could be 
delivered to these consumers. This means that firms within supply chains are obliged to work closely together 
and have to maintain continuous relations with each other.  
 
The ‘buyer-supplier’ - relations between companies and functions and successes of supply chains have for a 
long time been subject to study by scientists. This comes forward in a great number of publications (see e.g. 
Geyskens et al., Lambert & Cooper, Barratt, Christopher & Jüttner). Where does this scholarly interest for 
supply chains originate? The main reason could be that supply chains with a good functioning are to a high 
extend the origin of the force and successes of the economy (Lambert & Cooper). But - unfortunately - at the 
same time the reverse is applicable.  
 
Competition nowadays does not longer mean a battle of firm versus firm, but in stead of this a battle of supply 
chain versus supply chain (Lambert & Cooper). Direct effect is growing importance of supply chains to the 
economic process. All companies do have to collaborate closely to make a successful supply chain. 
 
Unfortunately collaboration does not originate out of itself: it definitely needs a lot of commitment between 
parties to grow. Commitment in its turn is dependent on structural factors as the channel interdependence 
structure and attitudinal factors as trust between partners (Geyskens et al.).  
 
The first factor could be distinguished in two sub-factors, viz. total interdependence and interdependence 
asymmetry. Actually, firms are mutually dependent upon each other. The sum of these two dependences of 
both collaborating firms upon each other has been called total interdependence of the two firms (Kumar et 
al.). On the other hand, the difference between the dependence of the one firm upon her partner in compari-
son with that of the other partner’s dependence upon the firm is called power asymmetry (Kumar et al.). The 
channel interdependence structure originates from the fact, that usually not all the firms within a supply chain 
are of the same growth or have equal power. Stronger parties are often inclined to rule over more dependent 
counterparts.  
 
The second factor - trust - comes forward from the need to collaborate with partners of unequal size. The 
weaker party does have to trust in the good benevolence of the stronger counterpart, if there is to grow or 
develop some collaboration between the two (Kumar et al., Geyskens et al.). 
 
The question arises now which could be the consequence or impact of channel interdependence and trust on 
relationship commitment. This question has been examined by Geyskens et al. in a study upon a supply chain 
of producing and selling parties, e.g. producers (or importing companies) and sellers of automobiles in the 
United States and the Netherlands. Herein the investigators did come to the conclusion, that effects of trust 
and interdependence on relation commitment are more complex than previously assumed. This is caused by 
the fact that a clear distinction can be made between two types of commitment, viz. affective commitment and 
calculative commitment.  
 
In the case of affective commitment it is concerning two partners who are really willing to keep a relationship, 
the second in those cases when partners are needing - or forced (!) - to collaborate with another (Geyskens et 
al.). Calculative commitment unfortunately did not get a prominent place in previous investigations in this field. 
That is the reason that in the Geyskens’ study the two types of commitment have been given an equal place. 
One of the results of this investigation is that trust and interdependence are having different effects on the two 
types of commitment. 
 
There are at least two reasons for the interest of the following investigation. The first one is the growing im-
portance of supply chains of mere services rendering companies within the total economy. On basis of figures 
of the European Union (EU) the percentage of service rendering companies within the EU is growing up to 
higher than 70% (see appendix 6, European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic data-
bases, statistical coordination and research activities, Brussels, 2009). The great interest of a study in a ser-
vice rendering supply chain is therefore very apparent because of the scope and great interest of services 
within the total economy.    
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The second reason for the following investigation is that it would be interesting to find out, if the results of the 
study of Geyskens et al. also are applying to supply chains without any production function. To the best of our 
knowledge the factors identified by Geyskens et al. have not been investigated in a merely services environ-
ment. Yet there are ample supply chains wherein there is only taking place rendering of services, for instance 
the banking business, (public) transport, the businesses of counselling or legal advice and financial services 
like banking or insurances. Hence, it is important to study whether the same relationship is holding.  
 
Our research will concentrate on a certain limited part of the services rendering chain of a damage insurer 
with regard to the insurances of automobiles and a number of repair companies of car damages (repairers). In 
short the process within this services supply chain is as follows. The insurer makes it his business to cover 
the risks of damage by and on cars in road traffic by paying the repairs of damaged cars. The repairers make 
it their task to repair the damaged cars, so that after reparation the cars are in the same condition as before 
the collision (or other cause of damage). In this case there could be spoken of a supply chain in which the 
main - no to say the only - business is the rendering of services to the final customers. The repairer is within 
this service chain supplier of a service - car repair - for which is asked by the insurer (and the insured cli-
ents!). Further on it needs to be mentioned that between the insurer and the insured clients there are situated  
operating intermediaries who are forming a guarantee for the quality of the rendering of services towards the 
insured clients. But the connection between insurer and intermediaries will be no subject of this investigation.   
 
The process of car recovery requires close collaboration between insurer and repairer, simply because there 
are many possibilities of malfunction in the system: wrong car, wrong insured or no insurance coverage, 
wrong place or time of damage or of repair, wrong repairer, wrong damage or wrong repair operation, lack of 
payment or wrong payment.  
 
Therefore the parties involved in this process should continuously be working closely together to tune their 
activities to another, e.g. their information systems. This process is already taking place towards the other 
side of the supply chain (towards the intermediaries) and could also be developed towards the repairers. For 
better performance parties should be open to learn from another in a process of continuing improvement of 
the total quality of the process (Chen et al.). Only by learning from each other this high goal could be reached.  
 
 
2. Literature 
 
It has been mentioned before, that all parties within the supply chains really do have to cooperate closely to 
streamline the flow of goods and services through the supply chain from (first) producer to (final) consumer. 
Although there is a certain tendency within supply chains to come to fewer but stronger relationships (Kumar 
et al.), very often supply chains still are consisting of a great number of parties. Moreover in many cases 
these parties are situated in different parts of the world, so that the flow from beginning to end is likely to be 
following a complicated route all over the world (for instance on the routing of the making of a CD - player. 
See appendix 8 - The Wall Street Journal).  
 
This also makes it very clear that the success of supply chains is for a great deal determined by the quality of 
collaboration between firms within the chain. We shall in this study focus on some factors that are influencing 
the development of this condition for success. Real collaboration can only originate when there is existing 
commitment between the parties within the supply chain (Geyskens et al.). This means that these parties 
should have at least a certain liking towards each other. 
 
Of course, the parties are not functioning structures by itself. They can only function by way of the acting peo-
ple within them and between the participating companies. Real collaboration within firms and between com-
panies is not that much depending upon technology or processes, but ultimately in most respects upon the 
cooperation of people who trust each other (Sabath & Fontanella). According to Holweg et al. it all concerns 
to the level to which internal and external operations of companies are integrated. This means that true supply 
chain collaboration is not beginning at the gate of the company, but has to start within the very company.  
 
In almost all cases the parties within the supply chains are unequal in size and power (El Ansari & Stern). 
Because of this condition there are existing important counting factors like total interdependence and interde-
pendence asymmetry. The pressing question for every company in this respect is, what the consequences 
will be of the difference in size of collaborating companies with the own firm and what could be the challenges 
and threats of the change of a partner for another. Hereby one should well be aware of the fact, that the bal-
ances of power within supply chains are not a given and unalterable pattern, but that these balances could - 
and in many cases certainly will (!!) - change within very short time.  
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This makes it understandable, that the interdependence of the companies within the supply chains should be 
a factor of major and continuous attention by the management of every firm. Moreover there is the ever exist-
ing threat of competitors in other supply chains who are more than eager to take the companies’ position if 
they could get the change.   
 
The companies within the supply chains are mutually dependent upon each other: upon suppliers for the de-
livery of raw materials, semi-fabrics and/or services and - on the other side - upon customers for sale of 
(semi-)-products and services. This is applicable to every firm within the supply chains.  
 
According to several scholars named in the study by Kumar et al. the dependence of other companies within 
the supply chain is particularly clear in the possibilities - or the lack of these (!!) - of the own company to re-
place a partner by another party. The stronger the cooperation between two partners, the harder it will be to 
replace one of the partners by another. This counts also for the counterpart of the company (Kumar et al.). 
 
Collaboration between parties within the supply chain requires commitment to grow (Geyskens et al., Kumar 
et al.). In the survey by Geyskens et al. it has been emphasized, that the difference between affective and 
calculative commitment - as unfortunately often is happening - certainly can not be ignored. Global measures 
to strengthen commitment between parties within a supply chain are therefore bound to have a different im-
pact on firms with different types of commitment (Geyskens et al.).  
 
In addition to this a change of dependence or power of parties within the supply chain could have an impact 
on the both types of commitment. An increase of total interdependence is associated with a growth of affec-
tive and a growth of calculative commitment for both firms (Geyskens et al.). When on the other hand there is 
a development to growing asymmetry of interdependence this will in many cases be associated with a de-
crease of calculative commitment for both firms. Under these circumstances affective commitment for the 
more powerful party is likely to be reduced, while this type of commitment for the more dependent firm is go-
ing to be of more importance. This weaker party under these circumstances does after all not have any choice 
because of its dependence upon the more powerful firm (Geyskens et al.). 
 
Another factor of major importance for development and preservation of commitment (and consequently col-
laboration!) between firms is trust between the partners. There is something very basic about trust. Even 
without any knowledge of or insight in the functioning of supply chains one could easily understand that with-
out any trust there can be no speaking of collaboration. A company should for its line of production have a lot 
of trust that the ordered goods or raw materials or services will be delivered as ordered and in time and in the 
right quality and place.  
 
For instance, Toyota Motor, a huge Japanese car producer has even made this the very essence of its col-
laboration with their suppliers: just-in-time deliveries! Without mutual trust between the parties involved this 
concept never could have been developed. Probably being the most powerful ‘player’ within ‘their’ supply 
chain Toyota Motor certainly does have the means to control this chain. In this case in the ‘Toyota’ chain we 
can assume that the chain leader is striving to fewer but stronger relationships (viz. Kumar et al.). To reach 
this goal it is important to get a good understanding of the ruling type of commitment between partners. 
 
Of course, trust is concerning trust of people in - and between - the participating companies (Blois). According 
to this author this condition has radical consequences, because people within the organisation should be 
aware of what actions are appropriate within the context of the reputation of the company. After all, compa-
nies in itself are not capable to trust each other, these companies are naturally only functioning by the acts 
and actions of people. Trust between people has - by several scholars - been mentioned as the necessary 
mortar between the bricks of commitment and collaboration of companies (Kumar et al., Geyskens et al., 
Blois, Klein Woolthuis et al., Mason & Lefrere).  
 
According to Klein Woolthuis et al. people who trust each other will have less trouble in identifying and exam-
ining problems and getting more easily to appropriate and creative solutions. Mason & Lefrere will go still 
further in their admiration of trust: ‘In this regard, trust is identified as a primary enabler of a complex mix of 
processes and outputs that appear at this nexus. Processes involving consensus building, consultation, col-
laboration and knowledge sharing all are depending upon trust for effectiveness.’ The authors are convinced, 
that effective collaboration is mainly depending upon trust.  
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It will therefore be no surprise that trust between the people of collaborating companies is of great impor-
tance, especially when it concerns companies of unequal size. According to Mason & Lefrere effective col-
laboration is completely depending upon trust. Of course, collaboration is not a goal in itself. Mason & Lefrere 
argue that ‘trough collaboration common goals and mutual benefit are discerned and pursued; duplication of 
effort is minimized; innovation is stimulated’. 
 
Collaboration means that learning is an important goal (Nooteboom). According to this author ‘the exchange 
and joint production of knowledge between firms with different perspectives and competencies does require 
mutual absorptive capacity and a shared language for communication, to cross ‘cognitive distance’. This 
takes time to develop, and can require a dedicated investment, so that relations have to last a sufficiently long 
time to make the investment worthwhile.’  When done effectively, mutual understanding and trust merge in a 
process of interaction between parties (Nooteboom). Nooteboom gives as one of his hypotheses, that learn-
ing and trust are essential in inter-firm relationships.  
 
Collaboration and (inter-firm) learning implicate a more of less tight connection between the parties, which - 
according to Barthelman - implies data synchronization to improve the technological capabilities between 
them. Collaboration means in this respect a good and - for both parties involved - accessible information sys-
tem.    
 
As stated before, only some authors so far have distinguished a clear distinction between affective and calcu-
lative commitment (Kumar et al., Geyskens et al.). Therefore we shall adopt this same distinction in the follow-
ing as we investigate the relations between a number of factors tot these different kinds of commitment. Be-
sides these factors collaboration is a very important factor. Therefore we shall take these three elements, viz. 
affective commitment, calculative commitment and collaboration and try to find out the consequences of total 
interdependence, interdependence asymmetry and trust on the three mentioned structural elements.  
 
Moreover, because learning is an important condition for - the forming and maintaining of - collaboration be-
tween parties in the supply chain we intend to take also a few of the investigation questions of the investiga-
tion of Wu et al. - viz. learning intention, partner sensing and relationship initiation - and investigate their im-
pact on affective commitment. According to the mentioned authors these three key factors are essential to 
alliance formation.  
 
According to Grabher and Maintz there is a direct link between learning in formal and informal organization 
arrangements and innovation. They have pointed out the importance of learning and knowledge production 
amongst people in personal networks within and between the collaborating parties. According tot Chen et al. 
companies should learn from partners, customers and suppliers to develop innovations. 
 
 
2.1. Forming the hypotheses 
 
In this sub chapter we shall examine some appropriate relationships between variables of factors which are 
assumed to carry a contribution to the working and successes of co-operating firms within a supply chain. In 
chapter 2.1.1. we shall investigate the effects on affective commitment. Chapter 2.1.2. is dedicated to the 
relations with calculative commitment. In chapter 2.1.3. the effects on collaboration will come forward. In 
chapter 2.1.4. we shall discuss the relations of affective commitment, calculative commitment and collabora-
tion on the one hand with alliance performance on the other.  
 
In all cases and sub chapters hypotheses shall be presented, which are to be tested during the outcomes of 
the inquiry under the repair companies. At last, we shall within each of the following chapters discuss from the 
scientific theory to examples of the practice of insurer and repair companies. 
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2.1.1. Effects on affective commitment. 
 
Affective commitment occurs when two - or more (!) - parties adhere value to their mutual advantages (Kumar 
et al., Geyskens et al.), i.e. in this case certainly it is a matter of ‘marriage out of love’.  
 
Total interdependence 
When using the term ‘total interdependence’ we are referring to the sum of the two dependences of both col-
laborating firms upon each other (Kumar et al.). Total interdependence implies that the dependence of the two 
parties upon each other is both high and more or less equal (Geyskens et al, Kumar et al.). To reach this 
stage both parties must have made great investments in their mutual relationship.  
 
This implies at the same time, that the partners are willing to continue their relationship. After all, why should 
one make investments in a not wanted relationship? Hence, we expect an influence of total interdependence 
on affective commitment as well as on calculative commitment.  
 
We are aiming in this investigation at service firms: herein production is not visible and not tangible. In many 
cases the ‘product’ service is produced in front of the customer, resulting in the need that the service provider 
does not usually get a second change to do the job right. Therefore the service needs to be ‘produced’ right 
the very first time. This means also that cooperating partners are bound to have a thorough trust in each 
other.  
 
When - for instance -  the insurer points out to his insured client a repair station to get his damaged automo-
bile fixed, the insurer does not have the luxury or opportunity to wait if the job had been done correctly. The 
insured client awaits nothing less than a perfectly repaired automobile. Therefore the insurer has to have 
made precautions to make certain that the repairer delivers the quality required by the insured client and con-
sequently also by the insurer. To reach this situation there has not only to be total interdependence between 
the parties, but also the partners should have affective commitment: there must be a ‘marriage of love’ be-
tween insurer and (organisation of) repairers. 
 
In conclusion to the above, we hypothesize:  
H1: An increase of total interdependence is associated with an increase of affective commitment.   
 
 
Interdependence asymmetry  
As seen before in this essay the situation of interdependence asymmetry means that there is a difference 
between the mutual dependences of the two parties upon each other. Simply spoken in this case there is a 
stronger party experiencing power upon a weaker party. In case of a growing interdependence this situation is 
also developing in favour of the stronger party.  
 
Geyskens et al. have already reported in their investigation, that in this case the stronger partner does not 
necessarily have the need to maintain the relationship because of the waning dependence upon the weaker 
party. The reason for this party to maintain the relationship is an expectation of further-going exploration of 
their counterpart.  
 
For the weaker party the growing dependence upon the other party is a reason to continue the relationship 
because of the made investments in the past or because the input of the stronger party can hardly be missed. 
The difference between the dependence of the firm upon her partner in comparison with that of the partner’s 
dependence upon the firm is called interdependence asymmetry (Kumar et al.). An increase of interdepend-
ence asymmetry means that the balance of power between to parties within the supply chain is shifting in the 
advantage of the stronger party and the disadvantage of the other party.  
 
According to Geyskens et al. an increase of interdependence asymmetry does have a negative impact on the 
affective commitment of both parties. The stronger party can use its relative power on its counterpart to get 
his way, while the more dependent party is more or less obliged to meet the others’ demands. In both cases 
this process involves a decrease of affective commitment (Geyskens et al).  
 
In this investigation we take a look a the cooperation of insurer and repairers and we can regard this coopera-
tion as one of one large party - the insurer - and several much smaller parties - the repairers. This is the main 
reason for this investigation to be undertaken: which measures should both partners make to intensify the 
cooperation and their mutual communication. At the side of the repairers they are working together under the 
umbrella of the so-called ‘Stichting (in English: foundation) Schadegarant’.  
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The cooperation between insurer and the mentioned organisation of repairers should be organized in a such 
form that the unequal size of the parties is abolished. Communication between the two partners could be one 
of the instruments to reach this goal. Where ever necessary this communication could still be improved.  
 
We hypothesize: 
H2: An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with a decrease of affective com-
mitment.     
 
 
Trust 
As mentioned earlier in this essay, affective commitment is the type of commitment between parties who are 
willing to continue the collaboration because of the mutual advantages for both parties (Kumar et al., Gey-
skens et al.). In this case it is a matter of ‘marriage out of love’. Essential for this condition is the existence of 
trust between the partners. 
 
According to Nooteboom the essential feature on trust is that partners - who are trusting each other - are not 
afraid to be harmed by the other partner, even when the latter should have the opportunity. Even 2500 years 
ago the famous Chinese scholar Confucius (551 - 479 BC) underlined already the great importance of trust, 
when he stated that a ruler should maintain trust to the last to keep his authority, while in stead rather getting 
rid of food and weapons.  
 
Partners who trust each other, are knowing that they can rely upon each other to keep their promises or reach 
their goals. This also implies the expectation that the other partner has control over himself to produce a de-
sired action and be responsible therefore. It is hereby clear the organizations cannot trust: the ‘trusting’ of 
organizations has only to be done by the people - or groups of people - involved.  
 
In case of the cooperation between two service rendering companies - as in the case of the insurer and the 
repair companies - trust is also a very important feature. The insurer does have to trust, that the repair com-
panies will do the job the first time at once right, because that is what the clients are expecting. On the other 
side the repair companies should trust on the insurer for a sufficient amount of orders and - when they have 
been performed - for a prompt payment of their bills. Significant for companies in the service rendering sector 
is that the job has to been done right the first time. In many cases there will be no second chance. This does 
not only count for the repair companies, but also for the insurer in his handling the damage files.  
 
According to Geyskens et al. the absence of trust means in very many cases also the absence of affective 
commitment. We therefore hypothesize: 
H3: Higher trust is associated with an increase of affective commitment. 
 
 
Learning intention 
According to Wu and Cavasgil (2006) the learning intention of an organization could be described as the ex-
tent to which the organisation values learning processes for its survival. When given a high ranking this 
means that the organisation never takes the present level of knowledge or achievement for granted, but is 
always striving for improvement of services, products or production.  
 
According to Nooteboom ‘learning is an important goal of collaboration’. This also means that when a com-
pany is not prepared to be instructed or to stand open for improvement, the chances to successful collabora-
tion - at the best - will be rather poor.  
 
Chen et al. have pointed out, that learning in connection with collaboration only does have sense when it con-
cerns a learning process for both partners. By this way it should generate interaction between them. Moreover 
it requires a long-term view toward the relationship.  
 
With regard to companies within the service rendering sector it is applicable that they should have the need to 
do all things right the first time, because there will usually come no second chance to improve an already 
made failure. Because all companies are working with people - who can make mistakes - there should be a 
continuous attitude directed to improvement and learning of already made mistakes.  
 
Improvement can only be achieved in a company where there exists a continuous sphere of learning from the 
(top)management level down to the executing levels and reverse. 
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All above taken in consideration, we can hypothesize: 
H4: An increase of learning intention is associated with an increase of affective commitment.  
 
 
Partner sensing 
With the concept of partner sensing the authors have meant the ability (of a firm) to monitor the environment 
and search out and screen candidates for an alliance (Wu and Cavasgil, 2006). Partner sensing focuses on 
the qualifications of possible candidates.  
 
Because of the rapid developments of change of markets it is very important for companies to develop their 
networking to enhance their capabilities about relationship learning (Chen et al.). The authors are calling 
about relational capital, defining this as ‘the relationships between a firm and its upstream suppliers, down-
stream clients, strategic partners and other stakeholders’.  
 
Partner sensing and affective commitment do have a positive relation. After all the seeking and finding of a 
partner means that both partners are striving to collaboration for a longer period. This means that there must 
be a position of affective commitment for both.  
 
For the service rendering chain it is applicable that on the basis of already earlier mentioned arguments the 
choice of right partners is essential for the quality of the services to be rendered to clients. Possible partners 
who have made the quality-approach to their trademark should be laid pampered.  
 
On the other hand the cooperation with parties who do not achieve well, had better be terminated. This 
means that in the sector of service rendering partner sensing is an important and never-ending activity.  
 
We can hypothesize: 
H5: An increase of partner sensing is associated with to an increase of affective commitment.  
 
 
Relationship initiation 
Relationship initiation refers to the proactive formation of new alliances (Wu and Cavasgil, 2006). It empha-
sizes the actions a firm should take when forming an alliance. According to these authors an active approach 
is likely to form the basis for a lasting relationship between the parties in order to become real partners.  
 
This means that both parties - and certainly the initiating party - do need the employment of affective com-
mitment to reach this partnership.  
 
When we are looking at the sector of services rendering and we keep the above laid down statements about 
this sector in mind, the forming of relationships and the active attitude hereto is a logic next step in the devel-
opment towards a superb working services supply chain.  
 
Particularly in the services sector the cooperation of partners contributes for a great deal to the quality of the 
delivered services. It is therefore all about finding parties with who trust can be developed to build a superb 
relationship in order to come to excellent deliverance of services.  
 
We therefore hypothesize: 
H6: An increase of relationship initiation is associated with an increase of affective commitment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visualized in the following conceptual model ex. figure 1 these six hypotheses are given as follows: 
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Figure 1:   Relation between respectively total interdependence, interdependence asymmetry, trust, 
learning intention, partner sensing and relationship initiation on the one hand and affective commit-
ment on the other hand.  
 
 
 
2.1.2. Effects on calculative commitment. 
 
Total interdependence 
The repairers are bound to have the confidence that they for their labour will be paid promptly and correctly by 
the insurer: definitely an attitude of calculative commitment. Calculative commitment has more to do with two 
parties  - in this situation not automatic anymore partners (!) - which by way of the mutual dependences are 
forced to stick together (Kumar et al., Geyskens et al.). To remain in the same kind of already used compari-
son this relationship looks more like a marriage of understanding. It is - on basis of these assumptions - very 
plausible that a growth of total interdependence goes together with a growth of calculative commitment.  
 
At the same time in many chains partners are striving towards fewer but stronger relationships (Kumar et al). 
So they are eager to get to stronger relationships and to continue these.  
 
In the case of companies within the service rendering sector calculative commitment means that the parties 
are stuck together because of the lack of alternatives. It has been stated before that the cooperation between 
parties within the service rendering sector is of mayor importance because otherwise no service can be deliv-
ered.  
 
Calculative commitment often occurs in case of two parties working together because they are not able to see 
any alternatives in the form of other parties or because of high switching costs (Geyskens et al.). With a 
growth of total interdependence this situation grows more pressing for both parties.    
 
We therefore can hypothesize: 
H7: An increase of total interdependence is associated with greater calculative commitment.     
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Interdependence asymmetry  
As seen before interdependence asymmetry means that there is a difference between the mutual depend-
ences of the two parties upon each other. Simply spoken there is a stronger party experiencing power upon a 
weaker party. In case of a growing interdependence asymmetry this situation is even more developing in fa-
vour of the stronger party. Geyskens et al. have already reported in their investigation, that in this case the 
stronger partner does not necessarily have the need to maintain the relationship because of the waning de-
pendence upon the weaker party. The reason for this party to maintain the relationship is an expectation of 
further-going exploration of the counterpart.  
 
For the weaker party the growing dependence upon the other is a reason to continue the relationship because 
of the already made investments or because the input of the stronger party can not be missed.  
 
In the service rendering sector an unequal size of the parties means that certainly the weaker party is obliged 
to do everything to keep up the good relationship, because it is for this weaker party a matter of life of death. 
Also in this case the situation becomes more pressing for the more dependent party when independence 
asymmetry is developing in favour of the stronger party.  
 
For the stronger party it is more dependent upon the situation, whether this stronger party shall continue the 
cooperation with the weaker one. In case that this cooperation forms a real contribution to the profitability of 
the stronger party, there will be no reason to look for another partner. But when the cooperation also in this 
respect leaves to be desired, the stronger partner shall certainly investigate the possibilities for a change of 
partnership.   
 
We therefore hypothesize: 
H8: An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with an increase in calculative 
commitment.     
 
 
Trust 
With the concept of calculative commitment is meant the kind of commitment between (one or both) parties 
who are needing (and not necessarily willing!) to continue the relationship (Kumar et al.). The reason for this 
attitude may be formed by high investments made in the past or exit costs to end the relationship or depend-
ence of one of the parties upon goods or services from the other party (Kumar et al., Geyskens et al.). In 
these cases one (or both!) partner is bound to another in perceived structural constraints (Geyskens et al.). In 
many cases parties are likely to maintain the relationship to avoid high switching costs in doing otherwise 
(Kumar et al.). In this case it is more like a marriage of understanding in stead out of love or affection.  
 
Calculative commitment is a consequence of the unequal size of the collaborating parties within a supply 
chain. It has been mentioned before that in most cases of collaboration it is concerning these kinds of parties.  
 
Furthermore trust had been identified by several authors as major condition for collaboration between parties 
(Geyskens et al., Blois, Klein Woolthuis et al., Mason & Lefrere). According to Geyskens et al. trust has the 
important quality - even in situations of parties of unequal size (!) - to lead to focus less on calculative motiva-
tions and to emphasize the desire to maintain the relationship because of identification with and attachment to 
the partner.  
 
Amongst service delivering companies trust in good cooperation is a essential precondition for survival. When 
two parties just have started their working-together, it is not unusual that in the beginning the factor calculative 
commitment will be playing an important role. In this stage the parties certainly will be feeling out each other. 
This is particularly important because the quality of the delivered service is depending upon the quality of the 
cooperation. When all is going well after some time, trust between the partners will be growing and taking the 
place of calculative commitment.  
 
We can therefore hypothesize: 
H9: An increase of trust is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment for both part-
ners.  
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Learning intention 
A firm with a high focus on learning intention is striving for improvement of its own results. But also for better 
results for both parties. After all, the best way to be instructed is by receiving remarks made by the counter-
part. According to Nooteboom ‘learning is an important goal of collaboration’. Therefore also in this case the 
learning intention is directed on an improvement of the joint results of both parties.  
 
A strong learning orientation leads therefore to improvement of the own business performance. But also to 
improvement of the performance of the partner of cooperation. Chen et al. are indicating this fact with the 
term ‘relationship learning’.  
 
Wu and Cavasgil have indicated that the investment of an inter-firm learning stage is meaning a long-term 
project, directed to improvement of the results of both parties within the supply chain. Parties do in this case 
have the clear intention of working together for a longer period.  
 
The cooperation between companies in the service rendering supply chain can not avoid that certain mistakes 
are made. In fact this does not need to be a serious problem, as long as partners are prepared to learn from 
their failures and do take measures to prevent them the next time. This requires within the firms an overall 
openness to learning from mistakes and to continuously improving the processes.  
 
Hereto this attitude should actively be promoted by the management by rewarding all good initiatives from 
everybody within the company. As with trust an increase of this attitude will lead to a significant improvement 
of the delivered services and the processes to deliver them and at the same time to better cooperation and a 
decrease of calculative commitment.   
 
We can hypothesize:  
H10: An increase of learning intention is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment for 
both partners.  
 
 
Partner sensing 
According to Wu and Cavasgil the concept of partner sensing means the active search of a firm to find one - 
or more - partner(s) to improve the own business performance. This is contrary to calculative commitment, 
wherein there is some kind of obligation of one - or both parties - to cooperate. In this last case one can not 
speak of free will or enthusiasm between the two parties (Geyskens et al., Kumar et al.). However, in the first 
case - partner sensing - it concerns a free action of one or both parties to improve their outcome (Wu and 
Cavasgil).  
 
A good partnership - it has been said before and will be repeated here - is of essential importance between 
companies within the service rendering chain. After all, the delivered product - the service to the ultimate cli-
ent - has to be ‘produced’ right the first time. For instance to our object of study, the insurer is inclined to have 
the guarantee that the repair firm will deliver a perfect restored car after the car damage. And the repair firm - 
in its turn - expects a certain amount of work and - after it had been done - a strict and rapid payment.  
 
Because this ideal situation will not always be accomplished, partners within the service rendering sector in a 
number of cases do have to take leave from another. This means that partners in a supply chain of service 
rendering are obliged to follow an active policy of searching for and finding new partners to replace the non-
performing old ones. This implicates too, that partners in partner sensing are striving to good partnerships 
with mutual benefit for both. And it means eventually a decrease of calculative commitment.  
 
For instance, all repairers under the umbrella of ‘Schadegarant’ are periodically tested. In case of insufficient 
quality function the repairers are not longer allowed to remain bearing the ‘Schadegarant’ quality mark. They 
are replaced by better functioning repairers. This means that repairers with this quality mark should continu-
ously be striving for the best qualifications. 
 
We can therefore hypothesize: 
H11: An increase of partner sensing is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship initiation 
This concerns - as stated earlier in this essay - the active actions a firm takes to engage in the forming of one 
- or more - alliances with partners (Wu and Cavasgil). Here is applying the same contradiction with the situa-
tion under calculative commitment, as mentioned above.  
 
For service companies the need to form alliances has been coming forward in the last sub chapters. This 
means at the same time the need to build on cooperation and a decrease of calculative commitment. After all, 
when partners have found each other in a profitable alliance for both, there will be no need for this type of 
commitment. 
 
Therefore we will hypothesize: 
H12: An increase of relationship initiation is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment.  
 
 
Visualized in the following conceptual model ex. figure 2 these six hypotheses are given as follows: 
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Figure 2:   Relation between respectively total interdependence, interdependence asymmetry, trust, 
learning intention, partner sensing and relationship initiation on the one hand and calculative com-
mitment on the other hand.  
 
 
2.1.3. Effects on collaboration 
 
It should be underlined here that collaboration between partners in a supply chain is not a definitive goal for 
the achievement of the supply chain. However, it just is an important means to improve the performance of 
the supply chain. The goal is ultimately the result of the supply chain as a whole, which can only be achieved 
by superb results of the cooperating partners within the supply chain.  
 
Collaboration is for both parties in our investigation - insurer and repairer - of vital importance. The first to 
have the problems of the insured clients in a proper way solved, the latter for a certain part of their volume of 
business. The insurer needs the repairers because the insurer has clients with damaged cars, which they 
want to be fixed at soon and as good as possible. The repairers need the job to be forwarded to them, be-
cause the sheer existence of their companies depend upon this.  
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A particular condition follows out of the difference in supply of damages, which requires flexibility of both par-
ties and impedes a decent planning. This last quality does occur rather in the supply chain of service render-
ing companies than in that of producing firms. It forms still a greater necessity for stringent collaboration in 
this area.  
 
 
Total interdependence 
Total interdependence means a far-going integration on the activities of both partners (Holweg et al.) and is 
positively related to collaboration. After all, the situation of growing to total interdependence implies that both 
partners have made investments in building and developing their relationship. A growth of  total interdepend-
ence can therefore been seen as a growth of these mutual investments (Geyskens et al.).  
 
Further on, an increase of total interdependence goes together with a decrease of conflict (Kumar et al.). We 
may conclude that this corresponds with an increase of positive feelings of the partners and therefore an in-
crease of their efforts to collaborate. It is - on base of these assumptions - very plausible that a growth of total 
interdependence goes together with a growth of collaboration.  
 
Finally, according to Geyskens et al. high total interdependence leads to a situation where both partners pre-
fer their relationship to continue for affective reasons.  
 
As companies in the services rendering chain concerns, the above written is essential to deliver a quality ser-
vice. Without cooperation between service companies there can not be any speaking of delivering a service. 
To stick to the earlier used examples: an insurer without repair companies means nothing to his customers. 
Where could one find a qualified repair company to restore the damaged car?  
 
On the other hand: a repair company without insurance company means nothing either. Where can they find 
the assignments to keep their business at work? And moreover clients who are willing (and able!) to afford 
this expense. It must be very clear: insurer and repair company are bound to cooperate with each other in 
order to deliver the by clients desired services. When total interdependence grows this means therefore also 
a tighter cooperation between the partners. 
  
Therefore we can hypothesize:   
H13: An Increase of total interdependence is associated with an increase of collaboration 
 
 
Interdependence asymmetry 
In case of a growing interdependence asymmetry the stronger firm does not necessarily have to collaborate 
with the weaker partner, because there are alternatives. In some cases the cooperation shall be continued by 
the stronger party, because of the opportunities of exploitation. 
 
For the weaker partner the opposite is appropriate: they do have no means or possibilities to go for another - 
more equal in size - partner, because of the need of the products or services from the superior party or be-
cause of high exit costs or exit barriers (Geyskens et al.). Generally spoken the zest for collaboration has 
known better days than in this situation.  
 
When returning to the example of insurer and repair companies the factor interdependence asymmetry 
means an interesting situation, because here can be spoken of a large party - the insurer - working together 
with many weaker parties - the repair companies. The last ones have been brought together under the um-
brella of the Stichting Schadegarant, but the bottom line is that they still are remaining independent compa-
nies. This leads to the question in which way the mutual dependence is seen by the insurer on the one hand 
and the repair companies on the other. After all, when we are speaking about collaboration, we assume that 
parties do this out of free will and on a basis of equal power and quality.  
 
When the insurer - as more powerful party - uses this power to place his interests before (or in stead!) the 
interests of the repair companies, this can be seen as an example of an increase of interdependence asym-
metry, which inevitably must lead to a setback of collaboration.    
 
We therefore hypothesize:   
H14: An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with a decrease of collaboration. 
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Trust 
Several authors have underlined the strong effect of trust to commitment and collaboration and on several 
places above in this investigation this strong effect has come forward. We should like to mention Geyskens et 
al. (‘Higher trust increases affective commitment for both channel partners.’), again Geyskens et al. (‘Our 
results confirm that these - an increase of both total interdependence and trust …are major factors affecting 
relationship commitment’), Klein Woolthuis et al. (‘Trust is argued to have positive side-effects on … devel-
opment.’), again Klein Woolthuis et al. (‘The strong notion of trust entails the expectation that, within bounds, 
a partner will not be opportunistic even if he has both the opportunity and material incentive for it’).  
 
But other authors continue: Mason & Lefrere (‘In this regard, trust is identified as a primary enabler of a com-
plex mix of processes and outputs that appear at this nexus. Processes involving consensus building, consul-
tation, collaboration, and knowledge sharing all depend upon trust for effectiveness.’), another remark made 
by Geyskens et al. (‘We find that trust exhibits a robust and rather strong relationship … with other channels 
relationship constructs under a wide range of different conditions.  This provides quantitative evidence across 
a wide range of studies for the contention that trust is central to relationship marketing.’).  
 
And others are adding the following statements: Sabath & Fontanella  (‘Technology doesn’t make collabora-
tion. Processes don’t guarantee it. Although both are important, it’s ultimately the human interface and the 
trust that it can engender that build a truly collaborative relationship.’), Nooteboom (‘ ... learning and trust are 
essential features of inter-firm relationships.’),  Hibbard et al. (‘Nurturing trust and commitment …builds a 
reservoir of goodwill…’) and finally Kumar et al. (‘.. the critical importance of trust and involvement with the 
supplier in developing long-term relationships has been emphasized.’).  
 
These mentioned statements of several authors mean to our view an overwhelming support for and evidence 
of the great importance of trust within relationship marketing.  
 
When looking at our studied relation - the relationship between insurer and repair company - one can easily 
come to the conclusion that trust is an essential precondition for cooperation between the two partners and 
success for the output of the services supply chain. The insurer has to trust that the repair company will do an 
excellent job in fixing the cars. The repair company does have to trust in the regular supply of assignments 
and - after the job is done - in the quick payment of the bill.  
 
The presence of trust in this case - the services rendering chain - is more than important because the quality 
of the service requires the effort of both partners. Without that cooperation and trust to come to quality, there 
can not be any success at all. 
 
We now hypothesize:  
H15: An increase of trust is associated with to an increase of collaboration. 
 
 
Learning intention 
Earlier in this investigation it has already been mentioned, that learning intention has to do with the presence 
in the genes of the firm and all involved of a passion to learn and to improve the own production of goods or 
services and to learn from the made mistakes and failures (Wu & Cavasgil). It is clear that this can not be 
achieved without collaboration. After all, how can one improve without critical feedback from a partner or 
counterpart (Nooteboom)? Learning follows automatically from collaboration and reverse.  
 
There has already a lot been said about the necessity of learning from each other in the service rendering 
chain, so we can keep it short here. The preparedness to learn from each other means in this case that part-
ners should have an openness fro improving the process. Moreover they are open to each other in respect of 
their own malfunctions and mistakes in order to take measures to prevent them in the future. At last they have 
to be open to each other to improve collaboration.   
 
We can hypothesize: 
H16: An increase of learning intention leads to an increase of collaboration.  
 
 
Partner sensing 
It has been stated before: partner sensing is meaning an active search for a (or more) partner(s) to achieve 
together a better result than the single parties would have been able to achieve on their own (Wu & Cavasgil). 
This is also called synergy: the whole exceeds the sum of the contributing parts. It means too, that a partner 
sensing firm has an open mind for partners and improvement.  
 
If the search for a partner is successful, one could speak of a direct road to collaboration. This all counts too 
for partners in the service rendering supply chain. For more explanation we like to point a the text under this 
item earlier in this essay.  
 
We can therefore hypothesize:  
H17: An increase of partner sensing is associated with an increase of collaboration.  
 
 
Relationship initiation 
When firms are applying relationship initiation this means a strong strive of the partners for collaboration (Wu 
& Cavasgil).  
 
This all counts too for partners in the service rendering supply chain. For more explanation we like to point a 
the text under this item earlier in this essay. 
 
We can easily hypothesize:  
H18: An increase of relationship initiation is associated with an increase of collaboration.  
 
 
Visualized in the following conceptual model ex. figure 3 these six hypotheses are given as follows: 
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Figure 3:   Relation between respectively total interdependence, interdependence asymmetry, trust, 
learning intention, partner sensing and relationship initiation on the one hand and collaboration on 
the other hand.  
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2.1.4. Effects on alliance performance 
 
As mentioned before within this essay, the ultimate goal for the collaborating firms within a supply chain for all 
firms definitely is not collaboration or commitment. However very useful for the co-operation of firms these 
factors are only the means to improve the total achievement of the supply chain and reach in this way a com-
petitive - and sustainable - advantage above firms in other supply chains. It is all about the total performance 
of the supply chain.  
 
In this essay we have investigated the consequences of a number of factors or variables - total interdepend-
ence, interdependence asymmetry, trust, learning intention, partner sensing and relationship initiation - with 
successively affective commitment, calculative commitment and collaboration and developed hypotheses for 
each of these relationships. In the following we shall show in which ways affective commitment, calculative 
commitment and collaboration are related to alliance performance.  
 
Affective commitment 
Real collaboration between parties - to become partners! - can only originate when there is existing commit-
ment between the parties within the supply chain (Geyskens et al.). This means that these parties should 
have at least a certain liking to each other. Earlier in this essay we have indicated the preference of the exis-
tence of affective commitment to reach this goal.  
 
Besides affective commitment trust is playing a prominent role. According to Mason & Lefrere - and many 
others(!) - effective collaboration depends upon trust. But trust does have more benefits: the authors argue 
that ‘trough collaboration common goals and mutual benefit are discerned and pursued; duplication of effort is 
minimized; innovation is stimulated’. This indicates clearly, that collaboration and trust certainly do form a 
huge contribution to alliance performance.  
 
A second important factor is intra-organization learning. According to Grabher and Maintz there is a direct link 
between learning in formal and informal organization arrangements and innovation. They point out the impor-
tance of learning and knowledge production amongst people in personal networks within and between the 
collaborating parties. According tot Chen et al. companies should learn from partners, customers and suppli-
ers to develop innovations.  
 
Chen et al. have discovered, that learning in connection with collaboration does only have sense when it con-
cerns a learning process for both partners. It should generate interaction between them. Moreover it requires 
a long-term view towards the relationship. Next to collaboration and trust learning is forming the third essential 
prerequisite for parties to become partners in a lasting competitive supply chain. 
 
We hypothesize: 
H19: An increase of affective commitment is associated with an increase of alliance performance. 
 
 
Calculative commitment 
In literature is has been made very clear that calculative commitment is not the most fruitful way for firms 
within the supply chain to get their results (see for instance Geyskens et al., Kumar et al.). The reason for this 
is the unequal size of parties in this subject, which invites or causes the strong one to exploit the weaker 
party, while the latter one does not have the opportunities to seek and find a more suitable or equal  partner.  
 
This means, that in the case of parties who only share calculative commitment to each other, there can be no 
situation of ultimate alliance performance.  
 
We now must hypothesize:   
H20: An increase of calculative commitment is associated with a decrease of alliance performance. 
 
 
Collaboration 
Mason & Lefrere have been giving a firm statement, which we therefore shall give unaltered: ‘Collaboration 
and interoperability are identified as key organising principles in the various expressions of information - 
based and knowledge - based economies and both can be described as value-streams in a networked soci-
ety. Through collaboration common goals and mutual benefit are discerned and pursued; duplication of effort 
is minimized; innovation is stimulated.’  
 
And according to Himmelman - as stated by Mason & Lefrere - collaboration is ‘… exchanging information, 
altering activities, sharing resources, and enhancing the capacity of another [individual or] organisation, for 
mutual benefit, and to achieve a common purpose.’ (Himmelman, 1993:1).  
 
These judgements are surely as plain as can be: collaboration is an essential prerequisite for the performance 
of firms within the supply chain.  
 
Therefore we can hypothesize:   
H21: An increase of collaboration is associated with an increase of alliance performance. 
 
 
Visualized in the following conceptual model ex. figure 4 these four hypotheses are given as follows: 
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Figure 4:   Relation between respectively affective commitment, calculative commitment and collabo-
ration on the one hand and alliance performance on the other hand 
 
 
 
3.  Method and inquiry. 
 
We have indicated at several points in this essay that one of the important studies with regard of the function-
ing of supply chains is the study by Geyskens et al.: ‘The effects of trust and interdependence on relationship 
commitment: A trans-Atlantic study.’ (Geyskens, Inge et al.: The effects of trust and interdependence on rela-
tionship commitment: A trans-Atlantic study, International Journal of Research in Marketing 13 (1996) 303 - 
317). 
 
This study was carried out within the supply chain of producing and selling cars, viz. the part between dealers 
(with their contacts with the final customers) and their suppliers in the United States and the Netherlands. Of 
course it concerned a study upon a supply chain with a production function. Above that these investigations 
were mainly rendered between suppliers of cars and car dealers in the USA and the Netherlands (Kumar et 
al., Geyskens et al.). Our investigation on the other hand has been executed within a part of a supply chain 
with a completely service rendering function. 
 
Our intention has been to investigate a service rendering chain including a total different scope: the chain of 
an insurer in connection with car repair companies. Because of the fast growing interest of services a similar 
study within a part of a services rendering supply chain could be a valuable supplement to the former study of 
Geyskens et al. As shown in the following of this essay, we have taken the same inquiry questions as used in 
the Geyskens study to make a comparison possible between both studies (see appendices 1 and 2). 
 
Besides this we have also planned to use a number of investigation questions from the Wu and Cavusgil sur-
vey (Wu, Fang  & S. Tamer Cavusgil: Organizational learning, commitment, and joint value creation in inter 
firm relationships, Journal of Business Research 59 (2006) 81 - 89). Our principal reason for this choice is the 
huge interest of learning within the process of collaboration between partners. These questions can be found 
in appendix 3. 
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To be correctly used in the inquiry all investigation questions or comparisons at first had to be translated into 
the Dutch language. In a meeting with the chairman of the foundation ‘Schadegarant’ the first agreements on 
the inquiry were made. According to one of these agreements the inquiry comparisons were presented to a 
pilot group of car repair companies. 
 
The remarks made by this pilot group were added to the explanation which was to accompany each of the 
sets of comparisons. These comparisons have been presented to each of the - over 600 - joined car repair 
companies within the foundation ‘Schadegarant’.  
 
These companies are acknowledged by the mentioned foundation and are known because of their quality 
repair.  
 
Ultimately the questionnaire consisted of 51 comparisons on which each respondent was asked to fill in a five 
- point Liker scale (see appendix 4). 
 
By way of the internet and by the use of the well-known Belgian supplier of inquiries ‘Checkmarket’ 
(http://www.checkmarket.com/) the questionnaire was forwarded in November 2009 to 619 care repair com-
panies joined to the foundation ‘Schadegarant’.  
 
Of these population a sample of 314 respondents (= 50,7%) returned a fully answered - and in this way valid - 
questionnaire.  
 
We assume that this high response is bound to guarantee a valid sample form the population of ‘Schadega-
rant’ repair companies.  
 
Above these complete forms with of answers also 103 addressees returned a - more or less - incomplete form 
with answers, because of which fact these forms were not incorporated in the analyses. It is also worth men-
tioning that many of the respondents have been reacting very quickly (within a few days) and only a minority 
had to be stimulated by a repeated request of  ‘Checkmarket’ to fill in the questionnaire.  
 
As indicated and written above in this essay we formulated twenty-one hypotheses. They are - together with 
the bounded statements which are in the form of construct variables meant to prove the true of false of each 
of the hypotheses - depicted in appendix 5.  
 
To prove the ‘true’ or ‘false’ of each of these hypotheses we applied linear regression analysis upon - in some 
cases - a rather great number of variables. As seen in the following part of this essay we have used the statis-
tical method of linear multiple regression to each of the four sets of independent variables together with the 
accompanying dependent variable, which resulted in a number of outcomes.  
 
This has lead to an answer on the question which of the hypothesis has to be supported and which on the 
contrary had better be rejected.  
 
In the next chapter the results of these outcomes for every hypothesis shall shortly be spoken. 
 
 
 
4.  Results. 
 
As seen before we formulated not less than twenty-one hypotheses for our inquiry: six directed to affective 
commitment, six to calculative commitment, six to collaboration and the last three hypotheses were directed 
to alliance performance.  
 
In the following part of this chapter we present to you each of the hypotheses together with the construct vari-
ables on basis of which the hypotheses were tested.  
 
For a list of the design of these construct variables we would like to direct you to appendix 5. In this appendix 
are also included the mean, the standard deviation (SD) and the Cronbach’s Alpha (CA) for each construct 
variable.  
 
But first we give you some statistics in the form of mean and standard deviation and correlations in the first 
table.  
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Correlationsa 
  
 
Mean 
 
SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Tot. interdep. Pears. Corr. 1,5645 ,54187 *   
 
Sig (1-taild) 
   
        
Pears. Corr. 2,9296 ,66702 ,086   2. Interdep. Ass. 
Sig (1-taild)   ,056 
 
       
Pears. Corr. 2,1739 ,51323 ,538** ,092*   3. Trust 
Sig (1-taild)   ,000 ,046 
 
      
Pears. Corr. 1,6826 ,48073 ,360** ,092* ,223**   4. Learn. Int. 
Sig (1-taild)   ,000 ,044 ,000 
 
     
Pears. Corr. 1,6826 ,48073 ,268** ,113* ,120* ,411**   5. Partn. Sens. 
Sig (1-taild)   ,000 ,019 ,013 ,000 
 
    
Pears. Corr. 1,6826 ,48073 ,262** ,053 ,146** ,367** ,846**   6. Rel.init. 
Sig (1-taild)   ,000 ,165 ,003 ,000 ,000 
 
   
Pears. Corr. 1,6826 ,48073 ,452** ,317** ,430** ,405** ,376** ,351**  7. Affect. Com. 
Sig (1-taild)   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 
  
Pears. Corr. 2,9267 ,79098 ,044 ,902** ,066 ,029 ,035 -,008 ,188**8. Calc. Com. 
Sig (1-taild)   ,211 ,000 ,114 ,298 ,262 ,442 ,000 
 
 
Pears. Corr. 2,0066 ,64208 ,337** -,021 ,446** ,265** ,289** ,328** ,351** -,0149. Collabor. 
Sig (1-taild)   ,000 ,353 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,398 
 
Pears. Corr. 1,8432 ,38002 ,738** ,072 ,643** ,641** ,486** ,560** ,557** ,030 ,745**10. Allian. P. 
Sig (1-taild)   ,000 ,093 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,292 ,000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
         
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
         
a. Listwise N=341 
           
 
 
Table 1: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
In this table you find the matrix of correlations between the ten constructs which we have formed out of the 
fifty-one propositions of the inquiry. It shows that there is a positive correlation between almost any of these 
constructs. In one case however - see interdependence asymmetry - the results are rather poor in compari-
son with the results of the other constructs.  
 
We have used these constructs as independent variables during the first three regression analyses with as 
dependent variables affective commitment, calculative commitment and collaboration. The results of these 
analyses you will find below as means to support - or reject (!) the twenty-one hypotheses of this essay.  
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Affective commitment 
 
The first set of hypotheses (H1 up to and including H6) is directed to affective commitment.  
 
In the following tables the influence between on the on hand total interdependence, interdependence asym-
metry, trust, learning intention,  partner sensing and relationship initiation and affective commitment on the 
other hand shall be discussed by way of supporting or rejecting the first six hypotheses.  
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 ,643a ,413 ,402 ,39317 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Interdependence, Interdependence   Asymmetry, 
Trust, Learning Intention, Partner Sensing, Relationship Initiation.  
 
Table 2 
 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 36,297 6 6,050 39,136 ,000a 
Residual 51,629 334 ,155   
 
Total 87,927 340    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Interdependence, Interdependence Asymmetry, Trust,                 
Learning Intention, Partner Sensing, Relationship Initiation. 
b. Dependent Variable:   Affective Commitment    
 
Table 3 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -,015 ,147  -,102 ,919 
H1. Total inderdep. ,169 ,049 ,180 3,417 ,001 
H2. Interdep. Asymm. ,186 ,032 ,243 5,725 ,000 
H3. Trust ,241 ,050 ,243 4,865 ,000 
H4. Learning Intention ,191 ,051 ,181 3,762 ,000 
H5. Partner Sensing ,112 ,069 ,131 1,615 ,107 
1 
H6. Relationship Init. ,072 ,073 ,078 ,989 ,324 
a. Dependent Variable:   Affective Commitment    
 
Table 4 
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Conclusion: 
 
The first set of hypotheses all have to do with an important phenomena in the arena of cooperation between 
firms: affective commitment. We shall give these hypotheses in a row: 
 
H1: An increase of total interdependence is associated with an increase of affective commitment 
H2: An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with a decrease of affective commitment 
H3: Higher trust is associated with an increase of affective commitment 
H4: An increase of learning intention is associated with an increase of affective commitment 
H5: An increase of partner sensing is associated with to an increase of affective commitment  
H6: An increase of relationship initiation is associated with an increase of affective commitment.   
 
It shows, that the hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4 are significant and that with the hypotheses H1, H3 and H4 
a positive connection is presumed between the independent variables and the dependent variable affective 
commitment. As seen in the table 4 under the columns ‘B’ and ‘Sig’ these hypotheses have been supported 
by the results of the investigation. 
 
For hypothesis H2 is a negative connexion between the independent construct variable Interdependence 
Asymmetry and the dependent construct variable Affective Commitment assumed. Because of the signifi-
cance of this hypothesis this has also been supported by the outcome of the inquiry.  
 
The outcomes of the constructs variables partner sensing and relationship initiation have been proven not 
significant and therefore these hypotheses have to been rejected. This could possibly be declared out of the 
structure of this supply chain, wherein the repair companies are acting in an individual way without much 
need to co-operate with each other in order to form a stronger party within the supply chain..      
 
As mentioned before in this essay the importance of affective commitment for a successful and lasting coop-
eration can hardly be overestimated. By the four hypotheses H1 unto H5 we present a list of qualities which 
do have a huge influence on affective commitment. Those firms with a feeling that this type of commitment 
could need a boast, should use the above mentioned qualities to reach their goal.  
 
 
=================================================================================== 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
=================================================================================== 
 
 
Calculative commitment 
The second set of hypotheses (H7 up to and including H12) is directed to calculative commitment.  
 
With the second set of tables the influence between total interdependence, interdependence asymmetry, 
trust, learning intention,  partner sensing and relationship initiation on the one hand and calculative commit-
ment on the other hand shall be discussed by way of supporting or rejecting the second set of six hypotheses.  
 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 ,905a ,819 ,816 ,33968 
a Predictors: (Constant), Total Interdependence, Interdependence Asymmetry, Trust,  
Learning Intention, Partner Sensing, Relationship Initiation. 
Table 5 
 
Remarkable in this table is the high percentage of 81,6 of the variance which  
has been interpreted by the used model.    
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 174,185 6 29,031 251,606 ,000a 
Residual 38,538 334 ,115   
1 
Total 212,723 340    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Interdependence, Interdependence Asymmetry, Trust,                 
Learning Intention, Partner Sensing, Relationship Initiation. 
b. Dependent Variable:   Calculative Commitment    
Table 6 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) ,006 ,127  ,047 ,963 
H7.   Total inderdep. -,015 ,043 -,010 -,356 ,722 
H8.   Interdep. Asymm. 1,081 ,028 ,912 38,599 ,000 
H9.   Trust ,001 ,043 ,000 ,014 ,989 
H10. Learning Intention -,050 ,044 -,030 -1,132 ,258 
H11. Partner Sensing -,080 ,060 -,060 -1,332 ,184 
1 
H12. Relationship Init. ,012 ,063 ,008 ,190 ,849 
a. Dependent Variable:  Calculative Commitment    
Table 7 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The second set of hypotheses are dealing with another aspect of cooperation between firms: calculative 
commitment. We also give these hypotheses in a row: 
 
H7: Increase of total interdependence is associated with greater calculative commitment   
H8: An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with an increase in calculative commitment.     
H9: An increase of trust is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment for both partners  
H10: An increase of learning intention is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment for both 
partners 
H11: An increase of partner sensing is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment   
H12: An increase of relationship initiation is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment.  
 
We have already remarked, that the attitude of calculative commitment has all to do with a hidden goal of one 
(or both!) of the parties: in this case the party is mainly concerned with its own interest in stead of the interests 
of both parties.  
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It seems on base of table 7 that only hypothesis H8 is significant. This is the prove of the high cohesion be-
tween interdependence asymmetry and calculative commitment, which has also been described earlier in this 
essay.  
 
The other hypothesis (H7, H 9, H10, H11 and H12) were not  proven significant. This means that - on basis of 
our inquiry - there has not come out a clear coherence between total interdependence, trust, learning inten-
tion, partner sensing and relationship initiation on the one hand and calculative commitment on the other.  
 
This leads to the preliminary conclusion that ultimately calculative commitment does not seem to be working 
in the benefit of the cooperation of both firms and therefore could be threatening the success of the supply 
chain. 
 
=================================================================================== 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
=================================================================================== 
 
 
Collaboration 
The third set of hypotheses (H13 up to and including H18) is directed to collaboration.  
 
In the following table the influence between on the on hand total interdependence, interdependence asymme-
try, trust, learning intention,  partner sensing and relationship initiation and collaboration on the other hand 
shall be discussed by way of supporting or rejecting the third set of hypotheses.  
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 ,530a ,281 ,268 ,54918 
a Predictors: (Constant), Total Interdependence, Interdependence Asymmetry, Trust,  
Learning Intention, Partner Sensing, Relationship Initiation. 
Table 8 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 39,437 6 6,573 21,793 ,000a 
Residual 100,735 334 ,302   
1 
Total 140,173 340    
a Predictors: (Constant), Total Interdependence, Interdependence Asymmetry, Trust,                    
Learning Intention, Partner Sensing, Relationship Initiation. 
b. Dependent Variable:  Collaboration    
Table 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 25 -
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) ,360 ,205  1,758 ,080 
H13. Total inderdep. ,056 ,070 ,047 ,805 ,421 
H14. Interdep. Asymm. -,078 ,045 -,081 -1,732 ,084 
H15. Trust ,531 ,080 ,374 6,652 ,000 
H16. Learning Intention ,103 ,071 ,077 1,452 ,147 
H17. Partner Sensing ,036 ,097 ,034 ,377 ,706 
1 
H18. Relationship Init. ,233 ,102 ,200 2,280 ,023 
a. Dependent Variable:  Collaboration    
Table 10 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The third set of hypotheses are dealing with a another major important aspect of cooperation between firms: 
collaboration. We also like to give these hypotheses in a row: 
 
H13: An increase of total interdependence is associated with an increase of collaboration 
H14: An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with a decrease of collaboration 
H15: An increase of trust is associated with to an increase of collaboration 
H16:     An increase of learning intention leads to an increase of collaboration  
H17: An increase of partner sensing is associated with an increase of collaboration  
H18: An increase of relationship initiation is associated with an increase of collaboration.  
 
Just as seen by the first set of hypothesis also in this set we assumed a positive connection between the in-
dependent construct variables and the dependent construct variable Collaboration in the case of the hypothe-
ses H13, H15, H16, H17 and H18, while we assumed a negative connection in the case of H14.   
 
We have from the beginning and all through this essay stressed the importance of collaboration of firms for 
the economical success of  a supply chain. Let us now see, what the influence is of our independent factors 
on this dependent factor collaboration. It appears that only hypothesis H15 has been proven as significant. 
Moreover is evident the strong influence (‘0,531’) of trust on the dependent variable of collaboration.  
 
The other hypotheses within this set were - on basis of our investigation - not able to reach this status.  
 
We may conclude, that only hypothesis H15 (trust) on the subject of collaboration has been supported on the 
basis of the results of this inquiry. The other hypotheses based upon our construct variables were rejected as 
not being significant. The cause for this somewhat disappointing result must be found in the structure of this 
part of the supply chain with independent working repairers, who - however under the umbrella of ‘Schadega-
rant’  - are to a high extend very eager of maintaining their independent status. This could also explain the low 
scores on the subjects of learning and relationship building.  
 
On the other hand we found prove for the huge importance of the factor of trust, which forms a recognition of 
the earlier in this essay displayed interest of trust.  
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This means that there is for leaders of firms a strong tool available  to improve or to create the collaboration 
between partners within the supply chain. The basic condition for the development of collaboration and - con-
sequently - alliance performance of the supply chain lies in the development and grow of trust between the 
parties working within this supply chain.  
 
=================================================================================== 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
=================================================================================== 
 
 
The final  set of hypotheses (H19 up to and including H21) is directed to alliance performance.   
 
As we have indicated before, all effort - or struggle - should be directed to improve the total performance of 
partners within the supply chain. This should certainly be the real goal of all. Carrying that target in mind we 
shall take a look at the last three hypotheses. 
 
In the final table the influence between affective commitment, calculative commitment and collaboration on 
the one hand and alliance performance on the other hand shall be discussed by way of supporting or rejecting 
the final set of three hypotheses.  
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,810a ,656 ,653 ,22397 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  Affective Commitment, Calculative Commitment, Collaboration  
Table 11 
Also in this table is remarkable the rather high percentage of 65,3 of the variance  
which has been interpreted by the used model.    
 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 32,195 3 10,732 213,944 ,000a 
Residual 16,904 337 ,050   
1 
Total 49,100 340    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  Affective Commitment, Calculative Commitment, Collaboration 
b. Dependent Variable:   Alliance Performance    
Table 12 
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Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) ,617 ,067  9,217 ,000 
H19. Affective Comm.  ,256 ,026 ,343 9,832 ,000 
H20. Calculative Comm.  -,012 ,016 -,026 -,793 ,428 
1 
H21. Collaboration ,370 ,020 ,625 18,232 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable:   Alliance Performance    
 
Table 13 
 
 
The final three hypotheses deal with the target of this investigation: the success of the supply chain: alliance 
performance. The three hypotheses are: 
 
H19: An increase of affective commitment is associated with an increase of alliance performance. 
H20: An increase of calculative commitment is associated with a decrease of alliance performance. 
H21: An increase of collaboration is associated with an increase of alliance performance. 
 
For the construct variable alliance performance we have chosen a great number of proposals out of the in-
quiry. We think that in this way the existence of a balanced imagine of alliance performance will be made 
possible.  
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Looking at the contents of table 13 it turns out, that the two hypotheses H19 (affective commitment) and H21 
(collaboration) can be regarded as significant on the basis of the results of our investigation. These two quali-
ties are supposed to have a great influence on the performance of the alliances within the supply chain.  
 
As was expected hypothesis H20 (calculative commitment) did not reach a significant status and a similar 
quality is not expected to have a lasting positive influence of the results of the firms in the chain.  
 
 
=================================================================================== 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
=================================================================================== 
 
 
 
5.   Discussion and further inquiry.  
At the start of our investigation we formed the big number of 21 hypotheses of which a good deal has unfortu-
nately not been proven significant on basis of the results of this investigation. This means that some expecta-
tions about the needed qualities to make a success of the functioning of the supply chain have not been lived 
up to on basis of the results of our investigation. This counts especially for qualities like learning intention, 
partner sensing and relationship initiation.  
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The reason for this outcome should probably be found in the special fact that repair companies under the 
umbrella of the ‘Schadegarant’ foundation are especially technically orientated with a little focus on learning 
as meaning that they do not have the need to learn from a partner as the insurance company. They are pos-
sibly of the opinion that the technical repair of automobiles is their privilege of knowledge and that sooner their 
counterparts can learn from them in stead of otherwise.  
 
In case this is true - because it is only an assumption - it is particularly a pity, because in this way they do not 
only keep the door closed for any information from a non-technical outsight or source, but they also keep the 
communication and information flow in this way rather one-sided, which can not form a good basis for collabo-
ration.  
 
As to the qualities partner sensing and relationship initiation it could be assumed, that the repair companies 
are merely focussed on staying independent and leaving insufficient space to actively look around for possible 
partners  
 
On the other side we have made the discovery of the great importance of trust: the only hypothesis with this 
subject, which has been accepted in all sectors. This is again a recognition of the fact, that without trust as a 
beginning in the cooperation parties had better not start any at all. As stated earlier in this essay many inves-
tigators have stressed the importance of trust as an essential condition for the start of a fruitful co-operation of 
firms within the supply chain. Trust has been proven necessary for the development of affective commitment 
and good collaboration, which forms the basis for alliance performance. 
 
The other discovery has also been expected: the different effects of calculative commitment versus affective 
commitment. Hereby it has clearly been proven that the first type of commitment does not mean the beginning 
of a lasting successful cooperation, a factor in support of the findings in the investigation of Geyskens et al..    
 
We are reminding of the fact, that only in a few of the numerous investigations the scholars made a clear dis-
tinction between the two types of commitment: affective vs. calculative commitment. An exception on this 
omission is the investigation by Kumar et al.: The Nature and Consequences of Marketing Channel Interme-
diary Commitment (Working Paper, Marketing Science Institute, Report No. 94-115).  
 
The investigators make in this inquiry a distinction between three kinds of commitment: affective commitment, 
calculative commitment and moral commitment. Kumar et al. did come to the conclusion that ‘it is important to 
consider the motivation behind a firm’s current decision to continue to remain to the relationship.’  According 
to them there is a positive relationship between partners with a high affective commitment and their willing-
ness and desire to continue and enhance the relationship with  each other. This is also - but on a lower level - 
counting for partners with moral commitment, but not for parties with calculative commitment: ‘calculative 
commitment has a negative impact on intermediaries’ desire to stay and invest in the relationship.’    
 
This implicates that collaborating parties should carefully investigate under which type of commitment they 
are operation in order to become trusting partners. 
 
Of course we have only investigated a tiny part of the enormous working field of services rendering compa-
nies with its supply chain. This makes it necessary to advise that further investigations should be held within 
other parts of this terrain.  
 
Besides this it is also advisable that in future the subject of calculative commitment is being subjected to 
deeper investigation, because of the circumstance that in most cases the firms which are collaborating within 
the supply chains are unequal in size. As a consequence there will always be power and interdependence as 
major facts to be reckoned with within the balances of power between firms within the supply chain.  
 
The above inquiry has only been held amongst the independent repairers belonging to the ‘Stichting Schade-
garant’. It was not directed to the damage insurer ‘ASR Schadeverzekering’ or its employees. However this 
was planned to do so, for a balanced investigation this fact could be mentioned a defect. For the quality of a 
cooperation is a serious thing, which should investigated from both sides. Not only the management of the 
damage insurer but also the actual employees dealing with the damage dossiers are bound to have a serious 
effect on the quality of the cooperation.  
 
Besides that the management of ‘ASR Schadeverzekering NV’ and the ‘Stichting Schadegarant’ should have 
more seriously been involved with the inquiry and the results out of it. Despite the huge cooperation of the 
management of the ‘Stichting Schadegarant’ at the beginning of the inquiry, any later interest in the results of 
the investigation have been waned.  
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At the time of publication of this report the investigator is still taking every attempts to prevent the from the 
investigation emerging management recommendation to lay staying in a drawer without any influence on the 
management policy  of ‘ASR Schadeverzekering NV’ and the ‘Stichting Schadegarant’.  
 
At last the investigator should like to express his serious admiration for the willingness of a great deal of the 
repair companies of the ‘Stichting Schadegarant’ to participate in the investigation,. Without their cooperation 
to take some time to fill in the inquiry and their questions towards the investigator this investigation would not 
have been possible to have taken place. Especially for them this investigation should have benefit. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
Hypotheses used in the Geyskens survey. 
 
 H1. Greater total interdependence leads to higher affective commitment for both channel firms. 
 H2. Greater total interdependence leads to higher calculative commitment for both channel firms. 
 H3. Greater interdependence asymmetry decreases affective commitment for both channel firms. 
 H4. Greater interdependence asymmetry increases calculative commitment for the more dependent 
channel partner, but decreases calculative commitment for the less dependent firm. 
 H5. Higher trust increases affective commitment for both channel partners. 
 H6. Higher trust decreases calculative commitment for both channel partners. 
 H7. For both channel partners, the negative effects of interdependence asymmetry on affective commit-
ment are mitigated by trust. 
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Appendix 2.  
 
Used questions in the Geyskens survey. 
  
For affective commitment we (read: Geyskens and partners) used: 
1. Even if we could, we would not drop the supplier because we like being associated with them. 
2. We want to remain a member of the supplier's network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with 
them. 
3. Our positive feelings towards the supplier are a major reason we continue working with them. 
 
For calculative commitment we used: 
1. Staying with the supplier is a matter of necessity; 
2. It would be too expensive for us to terminate our relationship with the supplier. 
3. We continue to represent the supplier because we have no other viable option. 
 
Honesty: 
1. Even when the supplier gives us a rather unlikely explanation, we are confident that they are telling the 
truth.  
2. The supplier has often provided us information which has later proven to be inaccurate.  
3. The supplier usually keeps the promises that they make to our firm  
4. Whenever the supplier gives us advice on our business operations, we know that they are sharing their 
best judgment  
5. Our organization can count on the supplier to be sincere.  
 
Benevolence: 
1. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier will be ready and willing to offer us assis-
tance and support.  
2. When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned about our welfare.  
3. When we share our problems with the supplier, we know that they will respond with understanding  
4. In the future we can count on the supplier to consider how its decisions and actions will affect us  
5. When it comes to things which are important to us, we can depend on the supplier’s support  
  
Dealer dependence: 
-motivational investment 
1. Approximately what percentage of your firm’s sales are accounted for by this supplier’s line? ....%  
2. Approximately what percentage of your firm’s profits are accounted for by this supplier’s line? ...%  
3. Our relationship with the supplier is very important to the achievement of our organizational goals  
4. Over time, we expect this supplier to account for an increasing percentage of our firm’s profits and sales.  
 
Replaceability 
1. There are other suppliers who could provide us with comparable product lines  
2. Our total costs of switching to a competing manufacturer’s line would be prohibitive  
3. It would be difficult for our firm to replace the sales and profits generated from this supplier’s line  
 
Supplier dependence: 
Motivational investment 
1. To the best of our knowledge, approximately what percentage of the supplier’s sales in this trading area 
are accounted for by your firm? ...%  
2. The supplier considers our trade area a key market for their products  
3. The supplier’s relationship with us is very important to the supplier’s achievement of their organizational 
goals  
 
Replaceability 
1. In our trade area, there are other firms who could provide the supplier with comparable distribution.  
2. In our trade area, the supplier would incur minimal costs in replacing our firm with another dealer  
3. It would be difficult for the supplier to replace the sales and profits our dealership generates.  
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Appendix 3 Used questions by the Wu and Cavusgil survey. 
                          ‘Organizational learning, commitment and joint value creation in inter-firm relationships.’ 
 
 
Learning intention   
1. Learning in this organization is viewed as a key to organizational survival. 
2. Managers agree that our ability to learn is the key to remaining competitive. 
3. The sense around here is that employee learning is an investment, not an expense. 
4. This organization strongly encourages the incorporation of fresh ideas and knowledge into the workplace. 
 
 
Partner sensing  We actively monitor our environment to identify partnering opportunities. 
1. We routinely gather information about prospective partners form various forums (e.g. trade shows, indus-
try conventions, databases, internet, etc.) 
2. We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities. 
 
Relationship initiation   
1. We often take the initiative in approaching forms with alliance proposals. 
2. Rather than take the initiative to form alliances, we usually wait to be approached. 
3. Compared to our competitors, we are far more proactive and responsive in finding and ‘going after’ stra-
tegic partnerships.  
 
 
Alliance performance    
1. The competitive strength of your alliance network is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
2. Strength of your relationships with key alliance partners is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
3. Your organisation’s reputation in the market as a ‘partner of choice’ is very unsatisfactory / very satisfac-
tory. 
4. Stability of your alliance is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
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Appendix 4. 
 
Propositions used during the inquiry - and the sequence by which they were used during the inquiry 
 
1. Even if we could, we would not drop the supplier because we like being associated with them. 
 
2. We want to remain a member of the supplier's network because we genuinely enjoy our relation-
ship with them. 
 
3. Our positive feelings towards the supplier are a major reason we continue working with them. 
 
4. We want to remain a member of the supplier’s network because we genuinely enjoy our relation-
ship with it. 
 
5. Staying with the supplier is a matter of necessity; 
 
6. It would be too expensive for us to terminate our relationship with the supplier. 
 
7. We continue to represent the supplier because we have no other viable option. 
 
8. Even when the supplier gives us a rather unlikely explanation, we are confident that they are tell-
ing the truth.  
 
9. The supplier has often provided us information which has later proven to be inaccurate.  
 
10. The supplier usually keeps the promises that they make to our firm  
 
11. Whenever the supplier gives us advice on our business operations, we know that they are shar-
ing their best judgment  
 
12. Our organization can count on the supplier to be sincere.  
 
13. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier will be ready and willing to offer us 
assistance and support.  
 
14. When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned about our welfare.  
 
15. When we share our problems with the supplier, we know that they will respond with understand-
ing  
 
16. In the future we can count on the supplier to consider how its decisions and actions will affect us  
 
17. When it comes to things which are important to us, we can depend on the supplier’s support  
 
18. We can trust that the supplier does not abuse his position and really takes our interests in ac-
count.  
 
19. Approximately what percentage of your firm’s sales are accounted for by this supplier’s line? ....%  
 
20. Approximately what percentage of your firm’s profits are accounted for by this supplier’s line? ...%  
 
21. Our relationship with the supplier is very important to the achievement of our organizational goals  
 
22. Over time, we expect this supplier to account for an increasing percentage of our firm’s profits 
and sales.  
 
23. We are dependent upon the supplier. 
 
24. We are relying upon the supplier  for an undisturbed production in our company.   
 
25. We need the technical expertise of the supplier.. 
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26. There are other suppliers who could provide us with comparable product lines  
 
27. Our total costs of switching to a competing manufacturer’s line would be prohibitive  
 
28. It would be difficult for our firm to replace the sales and profits generated from this supplier’s line  
 
29. To the best of our knowledge, approximately what percentage of the supplier’s sales in this trad-
ing area are accounted for by your firm? ...%  
 
30. The supplier considers our trade area a key market for their products  
 
31. The supplier’s relationship with us is very important to the supplier’s achievement of their organ-
izational goals  
 
32. The supplier is dependent upon us. 
 
33. We are an important partner of the supplier. 
 
34. The suppliers needs our expertise.  
 
35. In our trade area, there are other firms who could provide the supplier with comparable distribu-
tion.  
 
36. In our trade area, the supplier would incur minimal (high) costs in replacing our firm with another 
dealer  
 
37. It would be difficult for the supplier to replace the sales and profits our dealership generates.  
 
38. Learning in this organization is viewed as a key to organizational survival. 
 
39. Managers agree that our ability to learn is the key to remaining competitive. 
 
40. The sense around here is that employee learning is an investment, not an expense. 
 
41. This organization strongly encourages the incorporation of fresh ideas and knowledge into the 
workplace. 
 
42. We actively monitor our environment to identify partnering opportunities. 
 
43. We routinely gather information about prospective partners form various forums (e.g. trade 
shows, industry conventions, databases, internet, etc.) 
 
44. We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities. 
 
45. We often take the initiative in approaching forms with alliance proposals. 
 
46. Rather than take the initiative to form alliances, we usually wait to be approached. 
 
47. Compared to our competitors, we are far more proactive and responsive in finding and ‘going af-
ter’ strategic partnerships.  
 
48. The competitive strength of your alliance network is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
 
49. Strength of your relationships with key alliance partners is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
 
50. Our organisation’s reputation in the market as a ‘partner of choice’  is very unsatisfactory / very 
satisfactory. 
 
51. Stability of our alliance is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
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Appendix 5. 
 
The hypotheses in this inquiry have been supported  - or rejected - by use of the following - independent and 
dependent - construct variables and calculating the linear regression analysis between these. In their turn its 
construct variable has been constructed by use of a number of the propositions, which were weighed by the 
participants on the inquiry.  
 
To clarify these processes each hypothesis has been mentioned with the names of the independent and de-
pendent construct variables with the underlying propositions by which each construct variable has been con-
structed.  
 
To prove that the propositions will definitely and fully contribute to the goal of the construct variable we have 
calculated for each construct variable the Cronbach’s Alpha (CA). Also on for each construct variable the 
mean and the standard deviation (SD) were calculated.  
 
 
 
 
 Affective commitment Mean  SD   CA 
     
H1 An increase of total interdependence is associated with an increase of affective commitment.      
  
Independent variable: total interdependence. 1,5645 ,54187 
 
,888 
 01. Even if we could, we would not drop the supplier because we like being associated with them. 
02. We want to remain a member of the supplier's network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with 
them. 
03. Our positive feelings towards the supplier are a major reason we continue working with them. 
04 We want to remain a member of the supplier’s network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with it. 
   
     
  
Dependent variable: affective commitment 2,0308 ,50854 
 
,715 
 21. Our relationship with the supplier is very important to the achievement of our organizational goals  
22. Over time, we expect this supplier to account for an increasing percentage of our firm’s profits and sales.  
30. The supplier considers our trade area a key market for their products  
31. The supplier’s relationship with us is very important to the supplier’s achievement of their organizational 
goals 
   
     
     
H2 An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with a decrease of affective commitment.    
  
Independent variable: interdependence asymmetry 2,9296 ,66702 
 
,702 
 05.  Staying with the supplier is a matter of necessity; 
06. It would be too expensive for us to terminate our relationship with the supplier. 
07. We continue to represent the supplier because we have no other viable option. 
23 We are dependent upon the supplier. 
32. The supplier is dependent upon us. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: affective commitment - see H1    
     
     
H3 Higher trust is associated with an increase of affective commitment.    
  
Independent variable: trust 2,1739 ,51323 
 
,878 
 08. Even when the supplier gives us a rather unlikely explanation, we are confident that they are telling the 
truth.  
10. The supplier usually keeps the promises that they make to our firm  
11. Whenever the supplier gives us advice on our business operations, we know that they are sharing their 
best judgment  
12. Our organization can count on the supplier to be sincere.  
13. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier will be ready and willing to offer us assistance 
and support.  
14. When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned about our welfare.  
15. When we share our problems with the supplier, we know that they will respond with understanding  
16. In the future we can count on the supplier to consider how its decisions and actions will affect us  
17. When it comes to things which are important to us, we can depend on the supplier’s support  
18. We can trust that the supplier does not abuse his position and really takes our interests in account. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: affective commitment - see H1    
 
 
    
     
H4 An increase of learning intention is associated with an increase of affective commitment.    
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Independent variable: learning intention                                                                                                            1,6826 ,48073 
 
,826 
 For the independent variable learning intention we used the following propositions: 
38. Learning in this organization is viewed as a key to organizational survival. 
39. Managers agree that our ability to learn is the key to remaining competitive. 
40. The sense around here is that employee learning is an investment, not an expense. 
41. This organization strongly encourages the incorporation of fresh ideas and knowledge into the workplace. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: affective commitment - see H1    
  Mean SD CA 
     
H5 An increase of partner sensing is associated with to an increase of affective commitment.    
  
Independent variable: partner sensing 2,0978 ,59537 
 
,766 
 42. We actively monitor our environment to identify partnering opportunities. 
43. We routinely gather information about prospective partners form various forums (e.g. trade shows, industry 
conventions, databases, internet, etc.) 
44. We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: affective commitment - see H1    
     
     
H6 An increase of relationship initiation is associated with an increase of affective commitment.      
  
Independent variable: relationship initiation 2,1833 ,55052 
 
,758 
 42. We actively monitor our environment to identify partnering opportunities. 
44. We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities. 
45. We often take the initiative in approaching forms with alliance proposals. 
47. Compared to our competitors, we are far more proactive and responsive in finding and ‘going after’ strate-
gic partnerships. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: affective commitment - see H1    
     
     
 Calculative Commitment    
     
H7 Increase of total interdependence is associated with greater calculative commitment.    
  
Independent variable: total interdependence 1,5645 ,54187 
 
,888 
 01. Even if we could, we would not drop the supplier because we like being associated with them. 
02. We want to remain a member of the supplier's network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with 
them. 
03. Our positive feelings towards the supplier are a major reason we continue working with them. 
04 We want to remain a member of the supplier’s network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with it.. 
   
     
  
Dependent variable: calculative commitment 2,9267 ,79098 
 
,708 
 05. Staying with the supplier is a matter of necessity; 
06. It would be too expensive for us to terminate our relationship with the supplier. 
07. We continue to represent the supplier because we have no other viable option. 
   
     
     
H8 An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with an increase in calculative commitment.    
  
Independent variable: interdependence asymmetry 2,9296 ,66702 
 
,702 
 05. Staying with the supplier is a matter of necessity; 
06. It would be too expensive for us to terminate our relationship with the supplier. 
07. We continue to represent the supplier because we have no other viable option. 
23 We are dependent upon the supplier. 
32. The supplier is dependent upon us. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: calculative commitment - see H7    
     
     
H9 An increase of trust is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment for both partners.    
  
Independent variable: trust 2,1739 ,51323 
 
,878 
 08. Even when the supplier gives us a rather unlikely explanation, we are confident that they are telling the 
truth.  
10. The supplier usually keeps the promises that they make to our firm  
11. Whenever the supplier gives us advice on our business operations, we know that they are sharing their 
best judgment  
12. Our organization can count on the supplier to be sincere.  
13. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier will be ready and willing to offer us assistance 
and support.  
14. When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned about our welfare.  
15. When we share our problems with the supplier, we know that they will respond with understanding  
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16. In the future we can count on the supplier to consider how its decisions and actions will affect us  
17. When it comes to things which are important to us, we can depend on the supplier’s support  
18. We can trust that the supplier does not abuse his position and really takes our interests in account. 
     
 Dependent variable: calculative commitment - see H7    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
  Mean SD CA 
     
H 10 An increase of learning intention is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment for both partners.    
  
Independent variable: learning intention 1,6826 ,48073 
 
,826 
 38. Learning in this organization is viewed as a key to organizational survival. 
39. Managers agree that our ability to learn is the key to remaining competitive. 
40. The sense around here is that employee learning is an investment, not an expense. 
41. This organization strongly encourages the incorporation of fresh ideas and knowledge into the workplace. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: calculative commitment - see H7    
     
     
H11 An increase of partner sensing is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment.    
  
Independent variable: partner sensing 2,0978 ,59537 
 
,766 
 42. We actively monitor our environment to identify partnering opportunities. 
43. We routinely gather information about prospective partners form various forums (e.g. trade shows, industry 
conventions, databases, internet, etc.) 
44. We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: calculative commitment - see H7    
     
     
H12 An increase of relationship initiation is associated with a decrease of calculative commitment.    
  
Independent variable: relationship initiation 2,1833 ,55052 
 
,758 
 42. We actively monitor our environment to identify partnering opportunities. 
44. We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities. 
45. We often take the initiative in approaching forms with alliance proposals. 
47. Compared to our competitors, we are far more proactive and responsive in finding and ‘going after’ strate-
gic partnerships. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: calculative commitment - see H7    
     
     
 Collaboration    
     
H13 An increase of total interdependence is associated with an increase of collaboration    
  
Independent variable: total interdependence 1,5645 ,54187 
 
,888 
 01. Even if we could, we would not drop the supplier because we like being associated with them. 
02. We want to remain a member of the supplier's network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with 
them. 
03. Our positive feelings towards the supplier are a major reason we continue working with them. 
04. We want to remain a member of the supplier’s network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with it. 
   
     
  
Dependent variable: collaboration 2,0066 ,64208 
 
,882 
 48. The competitive strength of your alliance network is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
49. Strength of your relationships with key alliance partners is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
50. Our organisation’s reputation in the market as a ‘partner of choice’  is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
51. Stability of our alliance is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
   
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
H14 An increase of interdependence asymmetry is associated with a decrease of collaboration.    
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Independent variable: interdependence asymmetry 2,9296 ,66702 
 
,702 
 05. Staying with the supplier is a matter of necessity; 
06. It would be too expensive for us to terminate our relationship with the supplier. 
07. We continue to represent the supplier because we have no other viable option. 
23. We are dependent upon the supplier. 
32. The supplier is dependent upon us.. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: collaboration - H13    
     
     
H15 An increase of trust is associated with to an increase of collaboration.    
  
Independent variable: trust 2,1739 ,51323 
 
,878 
 08. Even when the supplier gives us a rather unlikely explanation, we are confident that they are telling the 
truth.  
10. The supplier usually keeps the promises that they make to our firm  
11. Whenever the supplier gives us advice on our business operations, we know that they are sharing their 
best judgment  
12. Our organization can count on the supplier to be sincere.  
13. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier will be ready and willing to offer us assistance 
and support.  
14. When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned about our welfare.  
15. When we share our problems with the supplier, we know that they will respond with understanding  
16. In the future we can count on the supplier to consider how its decisions and actions will affect us  
17. When it comes to things which are important to us, we can depend on the supplier’s support  
18. We can trust that the supplier does not abuse his position and really takes our interests in account. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: collaboration - H13    
     
     
H16 An increase of learning intention leads to an increase of collaboration    
  
Independent variable: learning intention 1,6826 ,48073 
 
,826 
 38. Learning in this organization is viewed as a key to organizational survival. 
39. Managers agree that our ability to learn is the key to remaining competitive. 
40. The sense around here is that employee learning is an investment, not an expense. 
41. This organization strongly encourages the incorporation of fresh ideas and knowledge into the workplace. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: collaboration - H13    
     
     
H17 An increase of partner sensing is associated with an increase of collaboration.    
  
Independent variable: partner sensing 2,0978 ,59537 
 
,766 
 42. We actively monitor our environment to identify partnering opportunities. 
43. We routinely gather information about prospective partners form various forums (e.g. trade shows, industry 
conventions, databases, internet, etc.) 
44. We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: collaboration - H13    
     
     
H18 An increase of relationship initiation is associated with an increase of collaboration.    
  
Independent variable: relationship initiation 2,1833 ,55052 
 
,758 
 42. We actively monitor our environment to identify partnering opportunities. 
44. We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities. 
45. We often take the initiative in approaching forms with alliance proposals. 
47. Compared to our competitors, we are far more proactive and responsive in finding and ‘going after’ strate-
gic partnerships. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: collaboration - H13    
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 Alliance Performance    
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H19 An increase of affective commitment is associated with an increase of alliance performance.    
  
Independent variable: affective commitment 2,0308 ,50854 
 
,715 
 21. Our relationship with the supplier is very important to the achievement of our organizational goals  
22. Over time, we expect this supplier to account for an increasing percentage of our firm’s profits and sales.  
30. The supplier considers our trade area a key market for their products  
31. The supplier’s relationship with us is very important to the supplier’s achievement of their organizational 
goals 
   
     
  
Dependent variable: alliance performance 1,8432 ,38002 
 
,869 
 01. Even if we could, we would not drop the supplier because we like being associated with them. 
02. We want to remain a member of the supplier's network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with 
them. 
03. Our positive feelings towards the supplier are a major reason we continue working with them. 
04. We want to remain a member of the supplier’s network because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with it. 
10. The supplier usually keeps the promises that they make to our firm  
12. Our organization can count on the supplier to be sincere.  
13. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier will be ready and willing to offer us assistance 
and support.  
38. Learning in this organization is viewed as a key to organizational survival. 
39. Managers agree that our ability to learn is the key to remaining competitive. 
40. The sense around here is that employee learning is an investment, not an expense. 
41. This organization strongly encourages the incorporation of fresh ideas and knowledge into the workplace. 
45. We often take the initiative in approaching forms with alliance proposals. 
47. Compared to our competitors, we are far more proactive and responsive in finding and ‘going after’ strate-
gic partnerships.  
48. The competitive strength of your alliance network is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
49. Strength of your relationships with key alliance partners is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
50. Our organisation’s reputation in the market as a ‘partner of choice’  is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
51. Stability of our alliance is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
   
     
     
H20 An increase of calculative commitment is associated with a decrease of alliance performance.    
  
Independent variable: calculative commitment 2,9267 ,79098 
 
,708 
 05. Staying with the supplier is a matter of necessity; 
06. It would be too expensive for us to terminate our relationship with the supplier. 
07. We continue to represent the supplier because we have no other viable option. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: alliance performance - see H19    
     
     
H21 An increase of collaboration is associated with an increase of alliance performance    
  
Independent variable: collaboration 2,0066 ,64208 
 
,882 
 48. The competitive strength of your alliance network is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
49. Strength of your relationships with key alliance partners is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
50. Our organisation’s reputation in the market as a ‘partner of choice’  is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
51. Stability of our alliance is very unsatisfactory / very satisfactory. 
   
     
 Dependent variable: alliance performance - see H19    
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Appendix 6.   Percentages of the ‘services - share’ in the economic activities in the EU countries  
 
 
Gross value added at current prices; services      
Percentage of total gross value added      
               
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008      
               
BE 71,6 72,6 73,3 74,1 74,3 75,1 74,9 75,3 76,1      
BG 56,0 57,0 59,1 59,1 59,8 61,2 60,6 61,5 62,2      
CZ 58,0 58,3 60,0 61,0 58,1 59,1 59,2 58,7 60,1      
DK 70,6 71,4 72,2 73,1 73,4 73,1 71,9 72,4 72,6      
DE 68,5 69,0 69,7 70,2 69,6 70,0 69,6 68,7 69,0      
EE 67,3 66,9 67,4 67,4 68,0 67,4 67,2 66,8 68,4      
IE 55,5 56,3 56,2 59,7 61,5 63,1 64,4 64,8 64,2      
EL 72,5 72,2 74,6 74,4 74,8 74,5 75,0 75,9 77,0      
ES 66,4 66,6 67,0 67,1 67,3 67,1 67,2 67,4 68,3      
FR 74,3 74,7 75,5 76,3 76,6 77,0 77,3 77,4 77,6      
IT 68,8 69,2 69,7 70,4 70,5 70,9 70,7 70,4 71,0      
CY 77,3 77,5 77,0 77,2 77,3 77,7 78,6 78,8 78,3      
LV 71,8 72,4 72,7 73,5 73,3 74,5 74,6 73,2 74,2      
LT 63,9 63,8 64,9 63,4 62,3 62,3 62,8 62,7 62,8      
LU 81,0 80,7 80,9 81,4 81,9 82,9 84,3 84,0 83,7      
HU 62,4 64,2 65,5 65,8 64,9 65,6 65,9 66,3 66,2      
MT 69,1 72,7 71,8 72,3 74,1 74,9 75,1 75,5 76,4      
NL 72,4 72,8 73,6 73,8 74,0 73,7 73,4 73,6 72,9      
AT 67,2 67,7 68,5 68,6 68,7 69,0 68,1 67,7 67,3      
PL 63,3 65,4 66,8 66,0 64,1 64,8 64,6 63,8 64,3      
PT 68,6 69,1 69,9 70,9 71,4 72,6 72,9 73,0 73,6      
RO 53,6 49,9 51,0 52,8 51,4 55,0 55,0 56,5 55,4      
SI 60,9 61,5 61,9 62,4 62,8 63,2 63,3 63,3 63,7      
SK 59,4 60,5 61,0 60,6 59,5 59,9 57,5 57,2 59,8      
FI 62,8 63,3 64,2 64,8 65,4 65,7 64,9 64,1 64,9      
SE 69,4 70,1 70,6 70,9 70,6 71,2 70,6 70,3 70,5      
UK 71,7 72,8 74,1 75,2 75,6 75,9 75,7 76,3 75,6      
EA-
16 69,7 70,1 70,7 71,3 71,3 71,6 71,5 71,3 71,6      
EU-
27 69,7 70,2 71,0 71,6 71,6 71,9 71,7 71,6 71,6      
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  8: The voyage of …………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Wall Street Journal 
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